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Abstract: Does campaign duration affect election outcomes? To date, this question has largely
evaded political scientists, but it is reasonable to expect systematic links between campaign
length and candidate performance in elections. We hypothesize that longer campaigns would
help  challengers'  electoral  fortunes,  thereby  curbing  incumbency advantage and potentially
boosting competitiveness in elections. Using two data sources, aggregate data from U.S. House
elections between 1994 and 2006 and ANES survey data from the 2002 election cycle, we find
little  evidence  to  support  contentions  that  campaign  length  affects  election  outcomes  or
candidate familiarity. The results we report suggest the political consequences, intended or not,
to choices about election timing are likely minimal.
Keywords: campaign  duration;  campaign  length;  campaign  spending;  campaign  timing;
candidate familiarity; election outcomes; vote choice
1. Introduction
On 28 October 2009, President Barack Obama signed
into law the  Military  and  Overseas  Voter  Empower-
ment  (MOVE)  Act,  an  initiative  designed  to  help
military serving overseas and citizens who live abroad
to vote in U.S. elections. Among other provisions, the
law requires states to send absentee ballots to voters
overseas at least 45 days in advance of any federal
election, including special, primary and runoff elections.
As a practical matter, this provision has been problem-
atic for several states which have typically held late
congressional primary elections,  often in September,
to determine general election candidates for Congress.
The  Department  of  Defense  has  been  reluctant  to
grant  states  waivers  to  this  requirement,  so  states
have  revamped  their  electoral  calendars  to  hold
primary elections earlier in the election cycle. 
Ostensibly,  MOVE  was  designed  to  enfranchise
American  voters  living  or  serving  in  the  military
abroad, but the Act, which went into effect during the
November 2010 elections, will undoubtedly have other
consequences, intended or otherwise. One implication
linked to this policy reform, and alluded to above, is
that  general  election  periods  are  likely  to  be
lengthened,  at  least  for  some  elections  in  several
states. But what are the political consequences poten-
tially associated with longer campaigns? To date, this
question has largely evaded political scientists, but
it is reasonable to expect systematic links between
© 2013 by the authors; licensee Librello, Switzerland. This open access article was published 
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campaign  duration  and  candidate  performance  in
elections.  One  possibility  is  that  longer  campaigns
would  help  challengers'  electoral  fortunes,  thereby
curbing incumbency advantage and boosting compet-
itiveness in elections. In this paper, we investigate this
possibility  empirically  by  examining  data  from  U.S.
House elections between 1994 and 2006. Previewing
our  main  findings,  we find  evidence  that  campaign
duration does impact  election outcomes,  suggesting
there are important consequences, intended or not, to
choices  about  election  timing.  We  also  speculate
about the underlying mechanism that potentially gives
rise to this pattern. We analyze survey data from the
2002  American  National  Election  Study  to  demon-
strate that longer campaigns may advantage candid-
ates at the polls by raising awareness about them and
elevating name recognition. This effect appears to be
moderated by levels of campaign spending.
2. Incumbency and Campaign Length
Incumbent dominance at  the polls  has long been a
central  and enduring feature  of  American elections.
Scholars have traced incumbent strength to a number
of sources [1-3], but an advantage in incumbent name
recognition has emerged as a leading explanation [4].
As Jacobson notes, "people hesitate to vote for can-
didates they know nothing at  all  about.  Among the
most consistent findings produced by studies of con-
gressional  voters  over  the  past  generation  is  that
simple  knowledge  of  who  the  candidates  are  is
strongly connected to voting behavior" [4]. 
Discussions about the impact of name recognition
on voting preferences are often closely linked to ongo-
ing debates about  the deployment  of  candidate  re-
sources, most notably campaign funds. On this score,
researchers have been somewhat equivocal. Some [5-8]
argue that spending by challengers is more effective
than spending by incumbents, perhaps reflecting  the
relative  obscurity  of  challengers.  Others  [9-12]  find
incumbent  and  challenger  spending  to  have  similar
effects,  with challengers enjoying a smaller edge in
spending efficiency than suggested initially by Jacob-
son [5]. The problem of reciprocal causation resulting
from  strategic  behavior  by  candidates  and  donors
alike makes the precise relationship between spending
and election results  difficult  to  pin down,  but  most
studies suggest marginal returns are greater for chal-
lengers than for incumbents [4]. Taken as a whole,
these  findings  imply  that  policies  that  grant  equal
resources to both incumbents and challengers would
advantage challengers because of diminishing marginal
returns, a hypothesis that finds supports in recent field
experimental work [13].
Despite  an  abundance  of  studies  published  over
several decades devoted to disentangling the impact
of campaign spending on election outcomes, examina-
tions  of  the  impact  of  access  to  other  important
resources,  like  time,  are  scarce.  After  all,  time can
facilitate  information  acquisition,  and  scholars  have
shown the length of a campaign helps voters to make
use of important electoral information [14]. Moreover,
unlike campaign spending, whose causal  effects are
methodologically challenging to isolate because they
can be linked to expected outcomes, the duration of a
campaign is exogenously determined and assigned in
an even-handed manner to all  candidate types in a
given state. As we demonstrate below, the duration of
campaigns varies considerably over time and across
states, and this variation can be exploited to gauge
the effects  of  this  important  resource on candidate
voteshares. 
Given the  discussion above,  we hypothesize  that
longer campaigns would disproportionately advantage
challengers over incumbents. Longer campaigns would
conceivably afford challengers greater opportunities to
build awareness of their candidacies and to cut into
incumbents'  name  recognition  advantages.  In  this
study, we investigate this possibility using data from
elections for the U.S. House of Representatives between
1994 and 2006. We find support for the contentions
that campaign duration affects election outcomes and
that longer campaign cycles benefit challengers over
incumbents. We also find that the impact of campaign
duration is moderated by the level of campaign funds.
We proceed as follows. In the next section, we de-
velop more fully our ideas about the impact of cam-
paign duration on election outcomes  and provide a
more nuanced set of hypotheses. We then describe
the variation in campaign duration in states across the
country over the period of our study. In the following
section, we develop and estimate an empirical model
to test  our hypotheses and present  the results.  We
conclude with a discussion of the implications of our
findings.
3. The Impact of Campaign Length: Theory and 
Hypotheses
Evidence  from  studies  of  presidential  elections  has
demonstrated that candidate preferences rarely shift
dramatically  over  the  course  of  a  general  election
campaign, but that meaningful change can, and typic-
ally does occur [15]. Preferences form, crystallize or
change as a result of learning that is facilitated over
the course of a campaign [16]. As Gelman and King
[17] argue, campaigns convey information about the
values of "fundamental" variables; campaign activities
increase  the  amount  of  information  accessible  to
voters about candidates' true positions on issue prior-
ities as well as about the real conditions of important
considerations (like economic performance). The authors
assert that campaigns help to "enlighten" voters, but
such an educating process takes time [17]. As Steven-
son and Vavreck ([14], p. 223) argue, "[w]ithout suffi-
cient time for this kind of process, voters will be hard
pressed  to  correct  distortions  in  their  initial  assess-
ments which may be based on a very limited amount
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of information and only  a  few campaign messages.
[E]nlightenment should be less successful in very short
election campaigns than it  is  in  campaigns of suffi-
cient length."
A condition that, according to [17], is essential to
facilitating enlightenment is competition. Competitive
elections,  like  the presidential  contests that  the au-
thors  study,  ensure  that  biased  information  cannot
systematically  misinform  voters.  But  Stevenson  and
Vavreck ([14], p. 222) argue that symmetry and per-
vasiveness  are  linked  to  competitiveness.  "Without
symmetry, resource-rich candidates can dominate the
information that is conveyed to voters and so might
be able to mislead them systematically about the true
values and weights for fundamental variables that are
unfavorable to them." Related is pervasiveness, which
the authors conceive of as the ability to reach the bulk
of the electorate with their campaign messages. Using
data from 113 elections in 13 democracies, Stevenson
and Vavreck show that voters rely more heavily on the
true  values  of  economic  conditions  to  inform  their
preferences in relatively lengthy campaigns of at least
six  weeks  while  these  effects  are  largely  absent  in
shorter  campaigns;  they  conclude  campaign  length
matters for voter learning [14].
If it is the case that campaign length helps voters
to learn about important aspects of a campaign, like
candidate qualities and positions on key issues, then
longer  campaigns  presumably  afford  challengers
greater  opportunities  to  make  up  for  deficits  in
familiarity or name recognition they typically start off
with  [4],  relative  to  incumbents;  sufficiently  long
campaigns  should,  all  else  equal,  disproportionately
favor  challengers.  This  is  the  main  hypothesis  we
investigate below. 
But  longer  campaigns,  in  and of  themselves,  are
not necessarily sufficient to accrue benefits to chal-
lengers. Unlike the presidential contests that Gelman
and King [17] study, congressional elections are typic-
ally lopsided affairs characterized by resource imbal-
ances: "symmetry", at least with respect to financial
resources, is uncommon in races against incumbents
in particular [4]. Above we argue that sufficient cam-
paign length has the capacity to afford nonincumbents
the time to become more familiar to voters, but even
challengers with the luxury of longer campaign peri-
ods may not necessarily be able to capitalize on these
without adequate resources. It is also conceivable that
any  potential  benefits  associated  with  longer  cam-
paigns may be less  influential  for  well-funded  chal-
lengers.  Considerable  financial  resources  at  their
disposal  may  render  campaign  duration  less  con-
sequential  with respect  to its  influence on eventual
levels of support at the polls. Conversely, challengers
with scant  financial  resources  may benefit  more  so
from longer  periods  during  which  to  promote  their
candidacies. Accordingly, we argue the effect of cam-
paign  duration  on  candidate  performance  will  be
moderated  by  the  level  of  campaign  spending,  a
conditional hypothesis we examine empirically below.
4. Measuring Campaign Duration
The measurement of campaign duration can itself be
a debatable matter. In contemporary presidential nom-
ination contexts, the notion of an "invisible primary"
that often begins long before any votes are cast in an
actual  election  is  an  established  regularity.  For  the
purposes  of  the  current  study,  we  are  concerned
primarily with the length of the formal general elec-
tion campaign period, which we define as the total
number of calendar days between the primary elec-
tion and the general election. This choice is arbitrary,
and it is not intended to discount the significance of
the informal campaign period that typically unfolds in
advance of  primary Election Day,  sometimes over a
span of months or even years. Admittedly,  this is a
crude  measure  that  does  not  take  into  account  a
myriad  of  other  factors  that  could  include  whether
eventual  nominees  faced  contested  primaries,  how
soon before the  primaries  candidates declared their
candidacies or actually  began to campaign,  or vari-
ation  in  convenience  voting  or  levels  of  early,  ab-
sentee or mail-in voting in each jurisdiction. While re-
search  examining  the  effects  of  these  factors  is
worthwhile  in  its  own right,  we acknowledge these
limitations and view the current study as a first-cut in
examining  the  heretofore  unexplored  relationship
between campaign duration and outcomes. As such,
we are mainly interested here in the period beyond
the primary election, when candidates have secured
party  nominations  and  are  assured  positions  on
general election ballots.
Despite the fact that a uniform date for congres-
sional  general  elections  has  been statutorily  set  by
Congress since 1872 (for the Tuesday after the first
Monday in November of even-numbered years), regu-
lations concerning primary elections,  including dates
on which these contests are held, are reserved for the
states.  As  a  result,  there  is  considerable  variation,
both over time and across states in terms of primary
election dates. Researchers have observed that, over
the past few decades, states seeking greater influence
in presidential nomination contests have moved their
primary dates earlier and earlier in the process [18],
resulting  in  the  so-called  frontloading  phenomenon,
but  primary  elections  for  congressional  candidates
need not necessarily coincide with presidential primar-
ies; they often do not. As a result, the duration of the
general  election  campaign period,  in  terms  of  total
number  of  calendar  days,  for  congressional  races
varies  considerably  both  across  states  and  within
states over time.
Table 1 presents further evidence about the vari-
ation  in  the  mean  duration  of  the  general  election
period, as well as the range, for congressional election
cycles between 1994 and 2006. The data for the period
we examine indicate that general election candidates
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Table  1. Congressional  general  election  duration
(days), 1994–2006.
Year Mean (Days) Minimum Maximum
1994 122 (60) 14 245
1996 118 (58) 21 239
1998 114 (55) 45 238
2000 129 (64) 45 245
2002 116 (57) 43 245
2004 125 (63) 45 245
2006 122 (54) 45 245
Note: Standard deviations in parentheses.
have consistently had about four months on average
to campaign, but this span of time varies widely. In
the 1990s, congressional candidates in Arkansas, for
example, had only two or three weeks to campaign
against their  general election opponents,  while  can-
didates in states like Ohio, Texas and Illinois had al-
most eight months to do so. In the most recent cycles
we examine, the length of the general election period
ranges from about six weeks to eight months [19].
Above we argue that this variation may have import-
ant consequences for election outcomes. Candidates,
namely challengers, may be able to take advantage of
longer  campaign  periods  to  build  name  recognition
and  awareness  and  to  promote  their  candidacies,
while incumbents would presumably have an advant-
age in shorter campaign cycles. We also expect the
impact of campaign duration will be moderated by the
level  of  campaign  funds  accessible  to  a  challenger.
Next we proceed to estimate the impact of campaign
duration on candidate performance.
5. Estimating the Impact of Campaign Duration 
on Candidate Performance
Previous research has established that candidate vote-
shares in general elections are a function of a number
of  factors  including  resource  levels,  district  partisan
strength and candidate quality [4]. As we discuss above,
reciprocal causation between campaign spending and
expected voteshares make empirical examinations of
the  impact  of  campaign  spending  on  election  out-
comes a methodologically thorny issue. Scholars have
grappled with this issue for decades [4-7,9-12] offering
a range of solutions. Most of these studies advocate,
and several adopt, an instrumental variables approach
to  addressing  the  issue  of  reciprocal  causation,  al-
though the range of  instruments  for  spending  vari-
ables is diverse across studies. In the current study,
we  adopt  an  empirical  strategy  similar  to  the  one
proposed by Green and Krasno [9,10]. Specifically, we
use lagged incumbent spending as an instrument for
current incumbent spending in two-stage least squares
analyses. To be consistent with previous work in this
field, we also adopt the following conventions: first,
we convert all spending figures to 2006 dollars; as in
previous  studies,  a  log  transformation  of  campaign
spending (in  thousands of  2006 dollars)  is  used  to
simulate  diminishing marginal  returns;  to  make this
assumption less drastic, $5,000 is added to all candid-
ate expenditure levels (see [7] for details). A similar
transformation  was  performed  on  the  incumbent
spending instrument (incumbent spending in the pre-
vious campaign). Two-stage least squares purges the
independent  variables  of  their  covariance  with  the
disturbance term; the procedure involves estimating a
predicted  score  for  the  endogenous  regressor  (the
incumbent  spending variable),  in  this case,  from its
lagged  values,  and  using  this  as  instruments  in  a
second-stage regression instead of the original value. 
To isolate the impact of campaign duration on can-
didate performance in  general  elections,  we include
measures of campaign duration in a more fully spe-
cified  model  that  simultaneously  accounts  for  other
variables,  as  discussed  above,  known  to  influence
candidate  voteshares  in  elections.  We  estimate  a
series of  two-stage least  squares regression models
using  the  instrument  for  incumbent  spending  de-
scribed  above  [20].  The  basic  model  presents  the
challenger's share of the two-party vote in contested
general elections as a function of incumbent (instru-
mented)  and  challenger  campaign  spending,  chal-
lenger  quality,  and  incumbent  party  strength in the
district  and  campaign  duration.  We  also  include  a
dummy variable in the model to account for presiden-
tial election years as well as indicators to denote the
party of the challenger and redistricted districts; we
interact  the  challenger  party  indicator  with  dummy
variables for each year included in our study to ac-
count  for  national,  partisan  trends.  Consistent  with
previous work, we adopt  a dichotomous categoriza-
tion for challenger quality [4]; admittedly, a more re-
fined measure of quality would have been preferable,
however this was unavailable. Studies have repeatedly
demonstrated such dichotomous conceptualizations of
challenger quality to be quite robust and very highly
correlated with alternative, more refined measures of
quality [7]. Accordingly, we consider challengers with
prior  elective  experience  to  be  high-quality  chal-
lengers while those with no prior elective office are
low-quality. 
The results of the initial estimation, model 1 presen-
ted in Table 2, column 1, reveal patterns that are fa-
miliar given extant work in this field. We find evidence
that challenger performance is strengthened by higher
levels of both incumbent and challenger spending as
well as challenger party strength in the district and
challenger  experience.  The  results  also  suggest
challengers are disadvantaged somewhat in presidential
years.
Our key variable of interest, however, is the duration
of  the general  election period,  operationalized as the
total number of calendar days between the primary and
general elections. We estimate a second model (model
2) that adds this variable to the equation. The results of
the estimation are presented in Table 2, column 2. The
estimates reveal that the inclusion of the additional
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Table 2. Estimating the impact of campaign duration on candidate performance.
Model Specifications
Variable (1) (2) (3)
Challenger Party Strength in 
District 0.384 (0.012)*** 0.384 (0.012)*** 0.386 (0.012)***
Experienced Challenger 1.143 (0.303)*** 1.160 (0.303)*** 1.142 (0.304)***
General Election Duration 
(days) 0.002 (0.002) 0.003 (0.026)
Incumbent Spending (log) 
(instrument) 1.281 (0.278)*** 1.309 (0.278)*** 1.158 (0.663)
Incumbent Spending (inst.) 
× Duration 0.001 (0.004)
Challenger Spending (log) 2.384 (0.073)*** 2.380 (0.073)*** 2.630 (0.150)***
Challenger Spending (log) 
× Duration –0.002 (0.001)**
Challenger Democrat 1.606 (0.575)*** 1.592 (0.574)*** 1.592 (0.574)***
Presidential Election Year –5.898 (0.540)*** –6.032 (0.518)*** –6.023 (0.518)***
Redistricted 0.925 (0.613) 0.891 (0.612) 0.900 (0.613)
Constant 2.918 (1.783) 2.394 (1.807) 2.263 (4.258)
N of individuals 1,666 1,663 1,674
Adjusted R-squared 0.771 0.772 0.773
Notes: Two-least least squares regression (TSLS). In the first stage, incumbent spending (logged) is
estimated as a function of lagged incumbent spending (logged). These estimates are then used as
instruments for incumbent spending in the second stage in which the dependent variable is the
challenger’s share of the two-party vote in the district. Standard errors in parentheses. *** denotes
statistical significance at the p < 0.01 level, and ** at the p < 0.05 level, using two-tailed tests. All
models  include  dummy  variables  for  years  and  year/challenger  party  interactions  (not  shown;
available  upon  request).  Redistricting  years  (1992,  2002)  excluded.  See  text  for  details  about
spending and other variable measurement or construction.
variable denoting the duration of the general  election
campaign  does  not  substantively  alter  the  impact  or
statistical significance of any of the other variables. The
coefficient for the campaign duration variable is positive,
implying  longer  campaigns  may  boost  challenger
voteshares relative to incumbents, but the effect is not
statistically significant; moreover, it is, at best, substant-
ively modest. Extending the general election period by
100  days  would  only  add  0.2  percentage  points  on
average to the challenger's voteshare, all else equal.
We remind readers, however, that we expect the im-
pact of the length of the campaign to be conditioned
by the level of campaign spending. Thus, we estimate
a third model (model 3) to include interaction terms in
our model to capture the effects of campaign duration
as conditioned by candidate spending levels in addi-
tion to  the individual  constitutive terms accordingly.
The estimates  reveal  some familiar  results:  support
for  challengers  is  positively  and  significantly  influ-
enced by prior experience and partisan strength in the
district, as in the other two models. However, neither
incumbent  spending (instrumented) nor  the interac-
tion  between  campaign  duration  and  incumbent
spending  are  statistically  significant,  suggesting  in-
cumbent spending levels are statistically unrelated to
challenger performance once the other ingredients are
included in the model. The positive and significant im-
pact  of  challenger  spending  persists,  however.  The
direct  effect  of  the  campaign  duration  variable  re-
mains insignificant, however the interaction between
challenger spending and campaign duration is statist-
ically  significant  at  conventional  levels,  implying the
impact of campaign length is moderated by the level
of challenger spending, as hypothesized above. The
negative and statistically significant coefficient on the
interaction  term,  however,  suggests  the  effect  of
campaign  duration  declines  as  challenger  spending
grows. We interpret this to suggest the marginal im-
pact of campaign length declines with growing levels
of campaign spending, a result that is also consistent
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with  the  hypothesis  we  develop  above.  Still,  the
substantive effects are quite small. Figure 1 presents
a visual depiction of the impact of campaign duration
on challenger voteshares across ranging of levels of
logged challenger spending. The solid line displays the
marginal impact of campaign duration on challenger
support at the polls,  with dashed lines representing
the 95  percent  confidence  intervals  associated with
the impact of campaign duration for the corresponding
spending  levels.  Taking  uncertainty  levels  into  ac-
count, the evidence indicates the marginal impact of
campaign  duration  is  indistinguishable  from  zero.
Although there are indications the marginal effect of
campaign length likely declines somewhat as spending
grows,  the  overall  effect  is  negligible.  Next,  we
proceed to examine the impact of campaign length on
candidate familiarity.
6. Estimating the Impact of Campaign Duration 
on Candidate Familiarity
Above  we  argued  that  the  length  of  congressional
general election campaigns likely influences challenger
performance at the polls on Election Day. The ana-
lyses  we  present,  however,  provide  only  limited
empirical evidence for  this contention; for  the most
part, the effects are likely substantively small, at best.
To the extent  that  longer campaigns  may influence
candidate voteshares in elections, however, what could
be  the  driving  force  behind  any  such  effects?  One
possible underlying mechanism that could give rise to
the  hypothesized  effect  is  that  longer  campaigns
facilitate  voter  learning  and  raise  familiarity  with
challengers. Previous research has established a link
between familiarity and vote choice and demonstrated
that  greater  familiarity  increases  the  likelihood  of
voting  for  a  candidate  [4,21].  If  the  likelihood  of
voting  for  a  challenger  is  enhanced because longer
campaigns raise challenger familiarity, we should be
able to detect  empirical  evidence for  the latter.  Ac-
cordingly,  we  expect  that  longer  campaigns  raise
voters' familiarity with the candidates, especially chal-
lengers, cutting into the recognition advantage incum-
bents typically  enjoy [4] and that this is the causal
mechanism that may help to explain even the muted
effects on electoral support we identify above. Next,
we seek  empirical  evidence  for  the  contention  that
longer  campaigns  raises  candidate  familiarity,  even
after controlling for  other key factors  like candidate
quality and campaign spending.
We rely on data collected for the 2002 American
National Election Study for these analyses. The 2002
ANES probed respondents about their ability to recog-
nize congressional candidates in the November 2002
elections.  Analysis  of  the unweighted  data  confirms
incumbents' recognition advantage compared to chal-
lengers: 89 percent of respondents recognized incum-
bents, compared to only 58 percent who could recog-
nize challengers. We expect longer campaigns could
conceivably  boost  levels  of  recognition  for  incum-
bents,  but  we  argue  that  longer  campaigns  should
elevate challenger recognition levels even more so.
Figure 1. Marginal impact of campaign duration on challenger voteshares across range of challenger
spending (logged) levels.
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Table 3. Estimating the impact of campaign duration on candidate familiarity.
Recognize Challenger Recognize Incumbent
Variable
Incumbent spending 
(thousands of dollars, logged)
0.031 (0.323) 0.134 (0.423)
Challenger spending 
(thousands of dollars, logged)
0.209** (0.103) 0.015 (0.139) 
Experienced challenger 0.489*** (0.163) –0.066 (0.211)
Candidate Party Strength in 
District
0.019*** (0.007) 0.004 (0.009)
General Election Duration 
(days)
–0.001 (0.013) –0.003 (0.016)
Duration × Incumbent 
Spending
0.0005 (0.002) 0.0003 (0.003)
Duration × Challenger 
Spending
–0.0001 (0.0006) 0.00003 (0.001)
Constant –2.606 (2.065) –0.025 (2.691)
N 509 537
Pseudo R-squared 0.16 0.11
Log likelihood: –278.972 –147.119
Notes:  Probit  regression (unweighted).  Standard errors  in parentheses.  Dependent  variable  is
coded  1  if  respondent  accurately  recognized  challenger/incumbent,  0  otherwise.  ***denotes
statistical significance at the p<.01 level, ** at the p<05 level, using two-tailed tests. Models also
include the following political and demographic control variables (not shown): partisanship, age,
gender,  race,  income,  education,  whether  respondent  was  married  or  resided  in  the  South;
partisanship of the challenger (as well as its interaction with respondent party ID; details available
upon request). Source: [22]
We append the ANES data to include campaign vari-
ables shown to influence familiarity (campaign spend-
ing  levels  (logged)  [23],  candidate  quality,  partisan
composition of district) as controls (see [4]); we also
control  for  key  political  and  demographic  attributes
including a dummy variable to denote the challenger's
party (in addition to its interaction with a respondent's
partisan identification), partisanship, age, race, gender,
income,  education,  whether  respondents  were  mar-
ried  or  resided  in  the  South.  The  key  variable  of
interest  is  the  length  of  the  general  election  cam-
paign, measured in total number of days between the
primary  and  general  elections  as  above.  Again,  we
expect  recognition  to  be  positively  related  to  cam-
paign  length;  consistent  with  arguments  developed
above, we hypothesize further that the impact of cam-
paign duration will depend on the level of campaign
expenditures. We include terms in our models to test
these hypotheses, including interactions. We use probit
regression to estimate models to predict respondents'
ability  to  recognize  a  candidate  (incumbents  and
challengers separately) as a function of these variables
and the interactions.
The  results  of  the  estimations  are  presented  in
Table  3.  We  find  that  challenger  recognition  is
explained by challenger spending and experience and
the district's partisan tendencies. The estimates reveal
that  neither challenger nor incumbent recognition is
influenced by campaign duration; the interactions are
also statistically  insignificant,  suggesting there is  no
heterogeneity  in  the  impact  of  campaign  length
attributable to spending levels. Jacobson demonstrated
that support for U.S. Senate challengers in the 2000
elections  grew  over  time  during  the  course  of  the
campaign cycle in direct proportion to spending, but
the  author  did  not  examine  elements  related  to
campaign duration [20]. Jacobson also demonstrated
that  incumbent  familiarity  and  favorability  were  not
linked to levels of incumbent spending, a result that is
consistent with the estimates reported in column 2 of
Table 3 [21]. In fact, we find that incumbent recognition
is unrelated to the key factors we investigate including
spending,  candidate  quality,  district  partisanship  or
campaign  duration,  suggesting  that  sources  of
familiarity  with  incumbents  differ  considerably  from
forces that influence challenger recognition.
7. Conclusion
Overall, the preponderance of empirical evidence we
report suggests campaign length may matter little for
election outcomes once the effects of other, relevant
factors are taken into account.  That said,  there are
hints  that  campaign  duration  could  exert  the
hypothesized  effects,  but  additional  research  is
necessary  to  demonstrate  this  connection  more
definitively.  We acknowledge the substantive impact
of campaign duration is likely quite small, at best, but
it  may  not  be  wholly  irrelevant  to  candidate
performance.  Even so,  there  is  scant  evidence that
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campaign duration  is  related  to  familiarity  with  the
candidates, so the identification of a mechanism by
which  longer  campaigns  may  help  challengers,  if  it
does turn out to be the case,  remains elusive.  One
sobering  conclusion  readers  may  reach  from  the
current study is that if a pattern of longer campaign
periods  emerges  in  American  elections,  precipitated
by  recent  policy  reforms  or  otherwise,  there  are
unlikely to be significant electoral consequences. For
observers who decry anemic competition in races like
congressional  contests,  longer  campaigns  will  likely
not offer a glimmer of hope.
We  conclude  by  acknowledging  that  the  current
study and the theoretical arguments we develop raise
some  intriguing  possibilities,  but  it  is  beyond  the
scope  of  this  paper  to  explore  all  of  the  nuances
associated with campaign duration. Further research
could propose a more refined measure of campaign
duration that takes into account the dynamics of the
primary period or early voting. Additional work could
also contribute deeper insights about how campaign
length  operates  with  other  aspects  of  elections  to
influence outcomes. For instance, does the timing of
campaign appearances differ depending on campaign
length? How does news coverage of challengers and
incumbents vary depending on campaign length? How
does having a contested primary interact with these
other factors? Do contested primaries give challengers
a leg up by getting them early media exposure? Or do
contested primaries prevent candidates from beginning
their general election campaigns, ultimately hindering
their  chances  of  success?  The  central  mechanisms
linking  campaign  length  and  candidate  success  are
complicated and beg further scholarly examination.
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